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1 Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed many episodes of economic reform across the developing
world. Reforms across countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia were adopted with considerable
popular enthusiasm. However, sustaining and completing these reform packages has turned out to
be much more difficult, with policymakers having to ‘walk the line’ between success and failure.1 On
the one hand, in countries such as Brazil and India, economic reform has continued, albeit fitfully
and incrementally, despite their slow progress (Bardhan, 2005 and Kohli, 2006). In contrast,
despite being successful, economic reform has run into a political impasse in a number of other
countries (Rodrik, 2008). In this paper we develop a unified framework that allows us to analyze
the dynamic interaction between the progress of economic reforms and their political sustainability,
in a world with imperfect state capacity. In doing so, we throw light on the varied experience
with the sustainability of reforms across the developing world, to address three issues. First, why
might reforms that are proceeding successfully run into a political impasse? Second, is it easier or
more difficult to politically sustain economic reforms in countries where the fiscal capacity of the
state is better? Third, we examine the relationship between ethnic polarization and the political
sustainability of economic reforms. In doing so we ask: does ethnic discord intensify or mitigate
the politics of economic reform?
The political sustainability of reform is directly relevant to the issue of economic growth and
development. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) conclude that the likelihood of sustained
growth accelerations is significantly greater when fundamental economic reform is carried out.
However, as Rodrik (2006) points out, “What is required to sustain growth should not be confused
with what is required to initiate it”. (Emphases in original). One of the striking aspects of the
growth experience of many developing countries has been that the main difficulty lies not in their
inability to initiate economic growth, but rather in sustaining it, with the result that “...their growth
spurts eventually fizzle out” (Rodrik, 2006). And this ‘fizzling out’ may be precisely because of the
political difficulties of sustaining reforms under distributional conflict, imperfect state capacity or
even the onset of conflict on other dimensions (e.g. ethnic). Despite the long-recognized importance
of these issues, (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001, for an overview), there has been little examination of the
dynamic relationship between the unfolding of economic reforms and their political sustainability.
Accordingly, we develop a simple dynamic framework where a government may implement an
economic reform that potentially generates economic benefits to the populace. We follow Fernandez
1For an excellent early survey of the reform experience in developing countries see Rodrik (1996). A survey of the
more recent experience is provided in Rodrik (2006).
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and Rodrik (1991) in assuming that not only do reforms have distributional effects, but that there is
individual specific uncertainty, so that an individual does not know whether he will be a ‘winner’ or
a ‘loser’ from the reform. The main new feature in our framework is that both the implementation
of the reform, as well as the resolution of uncertainty about the identity of winners and losers,
is dynamic and revealed over time. At each stage, based on the outcome of the reform so far,
the government in power has the option to discontinue any further reform. Governments also
have the ability to tax winners to compensate losers (as in Jain and Mukand, 2003). The most
crucial element of our framework is that we endogenize both the government’s decision on the
continuation of reforms and on redistribution, through a political equilibrium involving the winners
and losers at each stage. The benefits that accrue to each individual at any stage derive both from
his identity as a direct ‘winner’ or a ‘loser’, together with any redistributive compensation. The
latter of course depends crucially on which group (the winners or the losers) is in political control,
and on limitations in state capacity. Imperfect state capacity (as in Besley and Persson, 2011)
places constraints on a government’s ability to efficiently administer and implement policies that
tax winners and compensate losers. Citizens may prefer to initiate or continue with a reform not
just because of the direct benefits that may accrue but also its dynamic political implications. If
a reform or its continuation alters the balance of political power, it may shift the government’s
incentive to tax winners to compensate losers. As we show, such considerations of the future effect
of reforms can have important consequences for their public support (or lack thereof) in the interim
and can lead to reforms stagnating.
While simple, our theoretical framework gives rise to a rich set of predictions. First, it throws
light on the dynamic evolution of political support for economic reforms. Economic reform, by
causing major structural changes, typically results in unemployment, dislocation and economic
hardship for significant proportions of the affected populations. Not only economists, but most
of the general public, probably understands this and still favors their adoption (see Przeworski
(1993) for evidence on this in the Polish context). However, Stokes (2001) highlights a puzzling
feature of the reform experience in many developing countries. Drawing on a series of case studies
on the reform experience in Latin America, including Fujimori’s Peru over the 90s (Stokes, 2001)
and Argentina over the period 1989-1996 (Echegaray and Elordi, 2001), Stokes highlights that,
in each of these cases, a relatively successful initial economic reform (as measured in real wages
and increase in GDP) was accompanied by the emergence of political opposition to reform.Indeed,
she begins her ‘summary of results’ by asserting that: “Our most startling result is that in every
country people sometimes reacted to economic deterioration by supporting the government and its
economic program more strongly. Conversely, they sometimes reacted to economic improvement
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with pessimism and opposition” (Stokes, 2001, p.25). In other words, popular support for the
government’s economic reform frequently seemed to vary negatively with its performance. So the
puzzle is why a majority of citizen-workers may change their mind about continuing with the very
policies that they had supported, even though their initial impact is favorable. Our framework
provides an explanation for why a reform, even though it may be initially successful and have
positive future prospects, may still run into a political impasse.
In order to see why a political impasse may emerge, we begin by observing that at any stage,
a citizen-worker’s political backing of the reform depends on his expected benefits from its contin-
uation. An important part of these benefits, especially for individuals who are not winners from
the initial stages of reform, is the degree of compensation to be expected from the winners. The
ability to extract this compensation through implementing redistributive taxation of course de-
pends on retaining political control. We show that both the probability and the expected cost of
losing political control is highest when the initial phase of reform has been successful, resulting in
a relatively large number of winners. This gives rise to the result that the relative success of the
initial phase of reform may actually decrease political support for continuation of the reform, even
if such continuation is expected to raise overall income.
For reforms that enhance overall income to also be beneficial for all individuals, it is essential
that the state have the capacity to tax winners from economic reform to compensate the losers
(Acemoglu, 2003). However, as emphasized by Besley and Persson (2011), the state in most devel-
oping countries has imperfect capacity to administer and implement such transfers. The natural
presumption is that improvements in state capacity for redistribution would typically increase po-
litical support for both the initiation of reform as well as its continuation. Somewhat strikingly,
we show that this need not always be the case. In particular, countries with higher state capacity
may find it more difficult to politically sustain successful economic reforms. The key insight is
that in countries with relatively high state capacity, the group in political control finds it much
easier to extract redistributive compensation by taxing winners. So in countries with high state
capacity, there is a much higher prospective tax revenue at stake. Therefore, the potential costs
of continuing with economic reform that may jeopardize their political control are much greater
in countries with higher state capacity. Our theoretical framework also highlights a more subtle
effect: whether greater state capacity hurts or helps the reform’s political sustainability depends on
the type of reform under consideration. In particular, greater state capacity has an adverse impact
on the political sustainability of reform if the dynamic evolution of the reform resolves uncertainty
about the identity of winners and losers relatively gradually, rather than quickly.
The results described so far have focused on the dynamics of reform and its sustainability in the
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presence of distributional conflict between economic winners and losers. If the reform also results in
winners (or losers) being concentrated in specific ethnicities, then ethnic political conflict provides
a further reason that the sustainability of economic reform may be undermined.2 However, the
opposite has also been seen in some countries. India’s experience with economic reform during
the nineties provides one such puzzling counter-example. Bardhan (2005) cites data from the 2004
National Economic Survey to emphasize the paradox of an economic reform that persisted despite
considerable unpopularity. In this context Ashutosh Varshney (1998) argues that
“... in so many multiethnic societies today, ethnic conflicts may enter mass politics more quickly
than disputes over economic reforms. The relegation of reforms to a secondary political status,
however, can work to the advantage of reformers, for a mass preoccupation with ethnic issues
provides political room to push reforms. Given a multiplicity of salient political issues, even minority
governments can press ahead with economic reforms.” (Varshney, 1998, emphasis added)
In an extension of our benchmark model, we draw on Glaeser (2005) to show that by engaging
in propaganda to deliberately increase the political salience of ethnicity relative to the economy, an
incumbent politician who stands to gain from further reform may be able to sustain and complete
it. Interestingly, we show that such a strategy, of using non-economic issues to ensure continuation,
works only when the initial success with the reform is in an intermediate range. Therefore, for a
range of moderately successful first-stage outcomes, economic reform may be continued not in spite
of ethnic conflict, but rather because of it.
Related Literature: This paper is directly related to the literature on the politics of reform in
developing countries (see Rodrik (1996, 2006) for surveys). Seminal contributions in the area
include Alesina and Drazen (1991) who show how a ‘war of attrition’ between different groups can
lead to costly delay, and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) who emphasize the importance of individual-
specific uncertainty in creating an inefficient bias against economic reform. Other channels that
may inhibit or delay reform have been investigated by several papers (e.g. Rubinchik and Wang
(2008), Jain and Mukand (2003)). Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) illustrate how elites may block
economic or institutional reform if it may erode their political power. This idea of an anticipated
loss of political control is also central to the analysis here. However, what is distinctive about
our analysis is that we focus on the dynamics of political control and how it relates to the issue
of political sustainability of reform, rather than its initiation (as most of the above papers have
studied). Accordingly, we analyze the impact on a reform’s sustainability of both how quickly the
2Evidence of this can be seen in the history of economic reform in a wide variety of developing and transition
countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, Armenia, Georgia and the former Yugosalavia (see Horowitz, 2005).
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distributional impact of reform is revealed as well as the government’s endogenous choice of whether
or not to compensate losers.
Furthermore, we enrich the framework on the political economy of reform by explicitly incorpo-
rating two features that are present in a wide spectrum of developing countries, namely the issues
of imperfect state capacity and the possibility of ethnic differences influencing politics. As we dis-
cuss in our analysis below, the impact of these two dimensions attains much more significance in a
dynamic analysis of reforms, as we do here. Accordingly, our paper is also related to the nascent
literature on state capacity and the political economy of reform, initiated by Besley and Persson
(2011, especially chapter 7). In studying the interaction of ethnic issues and reform, our paper is
also related to the recent literature on ethnicity and politics. Padro i Miquel (2007) shows how
ethnic differences can contribute to the perpetuation of bad incumbents and inefficient policies.
Glaeser (2005) analyzes when an incumbent politician may stoke hatred of a minority in order to
further his re-election chances. On the other hand, Testa (2012) suggests that ideological polariza-
tion across political parties may not be an unmitigated negative, and that the median voter may be
able to obtain better electoral accountability on economic issues when the ideological heterogeneity
is large. Esteban and Ray (2008) investigate conditions under which ethnicity is likely to be the
salient factor in conflict within society. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the
conditions under which reforms may be perpetuated due to ethnic considerations.
This paper is also related to the literature on the political economy of reform in the context of
transition economies (see the papers mentioned in the two excellent surveys by Roland (2002) and
Tommasi and Velasco (1996)). An important contribution of this literature has been its emphasis
on the design of economic reform to overcome political constraints. For instance, Dewatripont
and Roland (1992) underscore the optimality of ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics and partial reform in a
world where worker layoffs have to be achieved through majority consent. In contrast to much of
the transition literature, our paper does not explore the optimal design of reforms with a view of
sidestepping political constraints. Rather it takes the political constraints arising from democratic
politics as given, and explores how these constraints impinge on the sustainability of reform through
a variety of channels that are relevant for developing countries – the (endogenous) compensation
of losers, the role of state capacity, and identity politics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic framework is presented in sections 2.1
and 2.2, and the equilibrium without and with politics is presented in subsections 2.3 and 2.4. The
effect of state capacity is analyzed in section 2.5, while section 3 studies the impact of ethnic issues
on reform. We conclude with a discussion in section 4.
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2 A Model of Economic Policy Reform
We now describe the details of our framework, where, in each period, an elected citizen-policymaker
makes the decision of whether or not to initiate or continue economic reform. Individual citizen-
workers face individual-specific uncertainty with respect to the consequences of economic reform,
in which some will turn out to be winners and others will be losers. This uncertainty is resolved
gradually, over time, as the reform proceeds in stages. In addition to making decisions about
initiating and then continuing reforms, the elected citizen-policymaker can also choose a tax-transfer
scheme so as to compensate the losers, by redistributing some of the gains from the winners. Below
we describe a minimal framework that allows us to examine the consequences of the dynamic
interaction of the trajectory of reform with the underlying politics.
2.1 The Economic Structure: Reform and Wages
Consider an economy with two sectors, A and M , each of which employs labor to produce traded
goods. The productivity in each sector depends on a publicly supplied input, say infrastructure.
There is a unit mass of citizen-workers, each of whom inelastically supply one unit of labor, and
their wages in each sector are proportional to the productivity in that sector, which depends on
the amount of government expenditure on infrastructure in that sector. Suppose that rising world
demand for goods in sector M causes world prices in that sector to become much higher than
in sector A. Hence, an economic reform is being considered, in which government expenditure
is to be reallocated away from the less productive A sector and toward the more productive M
sector.3 Importantly, completion of this process takes time: for example, building infrastructure
or realigning the government’s administrative machinery to support a particular sector can require
substantial time and several stages to be fully completed.4 At each stage, the reform changes the
returns to labor in the two sectors, with wages in the M sector rising, while those in the A sector
3The two sectors could be, for example, the ‘traditional’ agricultural sector A and the ‘modern’ manufacturing
sector M. Alternatively, one can think of the two sectors as being an import-competing sector and an exporting
sector, where the latter can be promoted by the investment of government resources in ports and infrastructure, for
example, or the setting up of Special Export Zones (SEZs).
4While we directly assume, for tractability, that reform requires (at least) two periods to complete, this assumption
might also arise from a convexity in adjustment costs. A number of alternative formulations are possible: for
example, the reform might comprise tariff reduction as part of a process of trade liberalization. Due to prohibitively
high administrative costs of carrying out reform in all sectors all at once, it may be necessary to stagger their
implementation over time. Again, the issue arises of whether the full set of reforms gets implemented eventually, or
whether the process runs out of political support midstream.
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fall. This results in some intersectoral labor reallocation, with workers who end up in the M sector
gaining from the reform, and those who remain in the A sector losing, due to the fall in their wages.
However, ex ante there is uncertainty both about the proportion of winners as well as their identity,
in the sense that (at least some) workers cannot predict ex ante whether they personally will be
part of the group of winners.5
More specifically, we model the reform as a two-stage process, in which each stage of the reform
takes one period to implement. Initially, in period T = 0, the government faces the decision of
whether to launch the (first-stage) reform. If the reform is launched, the government in power
in the next period decides whether to continue the process of reform by implementing the second
stage. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, suppose that at the beginning, all workers are
employed in sector A. If the status quo is maintained, and there is no reform, then everyone earns
the same wage, denoted by w. If the reform is launched, then in the first period, there is uncertainty
about the ease with which workers can transition from sector A to M. We model this uncertainty
as each citizen having an identical, independent probability α˜ of finding employment in sector M.
Given the continuum of workers, this implies that a proportion α˜ of them find employment in sector
M.6 These are the “winners” – their wage goes up to w(1+θ), while the remaining proportion 1− α˜
5This individual-specific uncertainty might stem, for example, from the fact that workers in sector A, which is
adversely affected by the reform, will have to retrain in order to move to the growing M sector. While workers may
have some beliefs about how easy or difficult it may be for them to make the intersectoral move, they may not know
for sure. Thus there is uncertainty regarding the extent of these retraining and relocation costs. This uncertainty
can be both at an individual as well as at an aggregate level, the latter reflecting the aggregate costs to society from
such a reallocation. For a fuller discussion, see Jain and Mukand (2003) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).
6We are grateful to a referee for pointing us to the technical inadequacies involved in applying the Law of Large
Numbers to the continuum of i.i.d. random variables case (Judd, 1985). The main issue is that the integral
∫
[0,1]
xidi
(where xi ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable determining whether i is a winner or not) may not be defined and may not
equal α˜. In the large literature on this issue, several approaches have been suggested to ensuring that the integral is
defined and individual risk is eliminated in the aggregate (and thus the total proportion of winners equals α˜) (for a
systematic yet succinct discussion of the four popular approaches, see Appendix III in Acemoglu and Jensen, 2012).
In the context of our model, the most natural way to proceed is to apply the “discretization of the continuum” idea of
al-Najjar (1995) to the continuum [0, 1] of citizen-workers in which the above integral can be interpreted as pathwise
integration over sample paths and equals the sample average almost surely. More broadly, much of the applied
economics literature has also faced this problem (see Acemoglu et. al. (2012), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Bisin and
Verdier (2001), Fong and Szentes (2005), Robson and Samuelson (2009) to name only a few papers in different areas
which face this issue). These papers make the simplifying assumption that an appropriate version of the law of large
number holds for which the technical problem does not arise. Even in our context, such an assumption simplifies
the analysis, and accords with the natural interpretation of α˜, the probability that any individual will emerge as a
winner from the reform, as also representing the ‘size’ or ‘performance’ of the reform.
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who remain in sector A are “losers” with their wages decreasing to w(1− δθ). The reform is thus
characterized by two kinds of ex ante uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty about the aggregate
outcome α˜ of the reform; this could represent uncertainty about the difficulty of reorganizing the
economy through the reallocation of resources and labor from one sector to another. Specifically, ex
ante α˜ is commonly believed to be distributed over [0, 1] according to the cumulative distribution
function F (α˜). Second, there is individual specific uncertainty in that the identities of the winners
and losers are not known ex ante. As described above, we have assumed that in a given state α˜,
everyone has the same ex ante chance α˜ of being a winner. At the end of the first period, the wages
(and thus the specific identities of the winners and losers) are realized. The government in power
in period T = 1 then decides on the taxation regime, and can choose to redistribute the gains and
losses, a process that we describe in further detail below.
If the first stage of the reform is launched, then there is an opportunity to continue further, to
a second (and final) stage of the reform in period T = 1. Alternatively, the government in power
can choose to discontinue any further reform.7 In the latter case, i.e. if the reform runs aground,
there is no change to the realized wages from the first stage, i.e. the winners retain wages w(1+ θ)
while the losers continue to earn w(1−δθ). However if the government decides to continue with the
reforms, we assume that wages in sector M increase to w(1 + θ(1 + a)). Furthermore, among the
1−α˜ proportion of initial losers, each now has an independent probability α2 of finding employment
in sector M (at wage w(1 + θ(1 + a))). Those who remain in the A sector see a further decrease
in their wages, to w(1 − 2δθ), where 0 < 2δθ < 1. Thus, in the second stage of reform, there is
no uncertainty about the fraction of winners and losers, although there is still ex ante uncertainty
about their identity. The assumption of a known α2 in the second stage not only simplifies the
analysis, but also captures in a simple way the idea that there is usually much greater uncertainty
about the appropriateness of reforms at the initial stages. Again, at the end of this period, wages
are realized. The government in power in period T = 2 then decides on taxation to redistribute
any gains and losses.
The context we are considering here is economies in which there is a lack of credible institutions
that allow governments to pre-commit to execute compensatory transfers. As has been pointed
out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Acemoglu (2003), there are many reasons why such
instruments may be difficult to implement in developing countries. Secondly, we are also assuming
that poorly functioning financial markets, together with liquidity problems, do not allow capital
7While this is not the case that we systematically explore, we sketch out in footnote 18 the scenario under which
reforms may be reversed. The available evidence suggests that reform reversal is not in fact a very empirically relevant
case (Rodrik, 1996; Werner, 1999) - i.e., in practice, reforms tend to run aground, rather than being reversed.
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constrained citizens to obtain a diversified portfolio of shares across ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ sectors,
and thereby to insure themselves against the effects of reform.
2.2 The Citizen-Government, Elections and Redistribution
In terms of the political structure, we adopt a framework in which elections take place at the
beginning of each of the periods, T = 0, T = 1 and T = 2, where one of the citizens is elected to
run the government. Following the standard assumption in ‘citizen-candidate’ models (Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997), we assume that the elected politician cannot pre-commit
to undertake a policy, and voters rationally expect him to take decisions according to his or her
expected gains or losses from the decision. Furthermore, we assume in this section that there are
no ‘ego rents’ from being in office (we relax this assumption in the next section), so the elected
politician chooses policy to maximize his expected lifetime income. Anticipating the choices that
will be made by each type of politician, each citizen-worker makes his voting decision to maximize
his own expected income over the subsequent periods, net of taxes and transfers.8
At the beginning of period T = 0, since all workers are in the A sector and identical, the govern-
ment is assumed to be drawn randomly from the citizens in that sector. This citizen-government
makes the decision of whether to launch the reform (R0 = 1) or not (R0 = 0). The economic impact
of this first stage of reforms is realized at the end of the period, after which elections take place to
re-elect or replace the incumbent government. The government in power in period T = 1 makes two
policy decisions. First, it chooses a tax-transfer scheme t1 for the realized incomes so far, where
the higher income ‘winners’ may be taxed to compensate the ‘losers’ from the economic reform
so far. Second, in case the reform was launched, the government also makes the decision on the
second-stage reforms i.e. whether to continue with further reform (in which case R1 = 1) or halt it
at the current level (R1 = 0). Again, the economic impact of the reforms is realized at the end of
the period, after which elections take place to re-elect or replace the incumbent government. The
citizen-government in power in period T = 2 has only one policy decision, which is to determine
the tax-transfer scheme, t2, for the populace in that period. We assume that if there any ties in
the elections, they are resolved in favour of sector A, and if governments are indifferent between
8As will become clear in our analysis later, given two groups of voters at each election, the same outcomes would
result even if voters were to vote directly on policies, rather than for a citizen-government which chooses policy.
The usefulness of the citizen-candidate framework becomes apparent in section 3, when we introduce the politics of
‘identity’.
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implementing the reform or not, they do not implement it.9,10
Tax Structure and State Fiscal Capacity: We assume that a citizen-government’s choice of the tax-
transfer vector ti in any period i, is constrained by the administrative capacity of the state to collect
taxes and compensate losers. The argument for the importance of this fiscal capacity of the state
has been made most comprehensively by Besley and Persson (2011), who argue that this capacity
can differ across countries, due to differences in incomes, institutions and histories. Following
Besley and Persson (2011), we assume that the equilibrium (proportional) tax rate ti chosen by any
citizen-government will be constrained by the maximal tax rate τ that can be implemented by the
government, i.e. 0 ≤ ti ≤ τ ≤ 1 for any period i, where a tax rate of t means that a given worker’s
post-tax wage is a weighted average, with weights (1 − t) and t respectively, of his pre-tax wage
and the average wage across the population as a whole. Thus a choice of t = 1 means full income
equalization while, in contrast, t = 0 means no redistribution.We will examine the implications of
differences in state capacity τ on both the initiation and continuation of reforms.
We impose some standard restrictions on the tax-transfer vector ti: it must satisfy a balanced-
budget requirement, and workers with identical wages cannot be taxed at different rates. Fur-
thermore, we rule out a regressive tax on wages, and require that the tax-transfer scheme be
(weakly) ‘order-preserving’, i.e. workers with higher pre-tax income cannot end up worse off, post-
redistribution, than workers with lower pre-tax income.11
Having described the economic and political structure of the model, we summarize the timing
of the game in Figure 1.
ftbpFU5.38in1.4044in0ptTiming of the gameTimingfigure1.ppt.wmf
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis: Efficiency, and the Resolution of Uncertainty
Before analyzing decision-making with politics, we first establish a benchmark for economic effi-
ciency – the first-best decisions which maximize aggregate income, ignoring politics. We begin
9This assumption is done only for brevity in the presentation of the results. Assuming any other tie-breaking
rule will not affect the qualitative nature of the results regarding adoption or continuation of reforms since such ties
constitute a zero-probability event.
10While the model/game that we analyze in the paper has a specific timing of events, it is worth pointing out that
the crucial features that are required for the general structure of the analysis are the following: (i) the implementation
of the entire reform requires a period of time greater than one electoral cycle, (ii) there is uncertainty about the identity
of the winners and losers from reform, and this is revealed gradually over time, (iii) governments in power have the
ability to change policies, both with respect to the reforms as well as taxes.
11Thus, for example, the majority cannot simply expropriate all income of the minority. Furthermore, the wages
of all individuals are publicly observed; thus, there are no issues of private information in the redistribution here.
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by considering the second stage first. For a given realization α˜ of the outcome of the first-stage
reform, the decision of whether or not to carry out the second-stage reforms is based on balancing
the expected gains with the expected losses, i.e., according to whether:
α˜awθ + (1− α˜)[α2(1 + a+ δ)wθ − (1− α2)δwθ] ≷ 0
The first part of the left-hand side captures the further increase in wages of the first-stage winners
from the second-stage reform, while the second part gives the expected gains for the first-stage
losers. Observe that, if α2(1+a+ δ) > (1−α2)δ, i.e. the number of winners revealed in the second
period is relatively large, then the second part of the above expression is positive and it is always
optimal to continue. In the opposite case, continuation of the reforms is economically efficient only
if the initial mass of winners α˜ is big enough i.e. if:
α˜ ≥ (1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)
a+ [(1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)] = α
∗ (say)
As we will subsequently observe, these have very different implications for the policy sequences we
may observe in a political equilibrium and are related to how individual prospects develop over the
course of the reform. We denote these two cases by the following conditions.
Condition 1 : α2(1 + a+ δ) > (1− α2)δ i.e. α2 > δ1+a+2δ (“Positive future prospects”)
Condition 1′ : α2(1 + a+ δ) < (1− α2)δ i.e. α2 < δ1+a+2δ (“Negative future prospects”)
The two mutually exclusive cases relate to whether the probability α2 is relatively high or low.
Under condition 1, even the first-period losers expect to see an increase in their expected wage
in the second period (because α2 is relatively high), if the reform is continued. In a sense, the
resolution of the uncertainty about which workers emerge as losers and winners is gradual: in this
case, even if a citizen is not a winner from the first stage of reform, the chances of him eventually
emerging as a winner, at the end of the second stage of reforms, are relatively high. Thus, under
condition 1, it is always economically efficient to continue with the second stage of reforms.
By contrast, in the second case, condition 1′, anyone who is not revealed to be a winner at
the first-stage sees their prospects diminish further in the later stages. Thus the resolution of the
uncertainty about winners and losers is largely settled in the first stage of the reform itself. In this
case, continuing the reform into the second period will further benefit the first-period winners, of
course, but the expected returns to the first-period losers are negative, because α2 is relatively low,
i.e. very few new winners emerge in the second stage. Continuing with the second stage of reform
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can still be economically efficient if the additional gains to the first-stage winners are enough to
outweigh the expected losses to those who were first-stage losers i.e. if α˜ ≥ α∗.
Writing more succinctly, if the reform was initially launched, then in period T = 1, it is eco-
nomically efficient to continue with the second-stage of reforms only if α˜ ≥ αc1, where αc1 = 0 under
condition 1 and αc1 = α
∗ under condition 1′.
Going back to period T = 0, it will be efficient to start the reforms if the lifetime expected gains
from it are positive i.e. if the following holds:
(1 + β)(αθw − (1− α)δθw) + β
1∫
αc1
{α˜awθ + (1− α˜)[α2(1 + a+ δ)wθ − (1− α2)δwθ]}dF (α˜) > 0
(1)
where α is the expected value of α˜, and β is the discount factor for future payoffs.12 The first part
of the expression on the left-hand side gives the lifetime expected benefits from the first stage of
reform, while the second part is the incremental expected gain from implementing (if warranted)
the second stage of reform. Together, it is efficient to initiate the reforms only if the overall expected
benefit is positive.
2.4 Economic Reform under Political Constraints
In analyzing the game with politics, we are interested in examining the policy sequences that can
emerge in political equilibrium, which we define below. A policy sequence describes the sets of
decisions taken by the government at each stage: for the T = 0 government, whether to launch
the reform or not, R0 ∈ {0, 1}; for the T = 1 government, the choice of a tax regime t1 for the
period, and if R0 = 1, then whether or not to continue with the reform, R1 ∈ {0, 1}; for the T = 2
government, the tax regime t2 for the period. The reform decision taken by each government also
has implications for the probability distributions over the succeeding governments’ policy choices.
As mentioned earlier, given our assumptions, each citizen-government chooses policies to maxi-
mize his expected income. Anticipating the choices that will be made by each type of politician in
a political equilibrium, each citizen-worker makes his voting decision to maximize his own expected
income over the subsequent periods, net of taxes and transfers.13
12If there was a non-zero cost K to launching the reforms, it would be incorporated into the right-hand side of the
above inequality and the qualitative nature of the results would remain unchanged.
13We should point out that the structure of government policy-making and of voting here is that of the citizen-
candidate framework, as in Besley and Coate (1997), and Osborne and Slivinski (1996).They also analyze the issue
of the slate of candidates who stand for election when voters’ preferences are dispersed. In our case, with two groups
of voters, this issue becomes particularly simple.
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We now analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of our game with political constraints.
We are mainly interested in examining the conditions under which equilibrium policy sequences
involve full versus partial reform, i.e. whether economically efficient reforms can be politically
sustained, or whether they may hit a political impasse and run aground.
The simplicity of the economic and political structure of our model makes the description of
equilibrium, of the electoral game in each period, straightforward. To begin with, recall that at the
start of the game, at T = 0, all workers are employed in sector A and are identical. Thus voters
will be indifferent across any citizen-candidates that stand for election and will randomly choose
among them. If the reform is enacted, then at the end of each period, two groups of voters emerge
– the “winners” (i.e. those who have been able to move to sector M) and the “losers” (i.e. those
who remain in sector A). Since politicians cannot credibly pre-commit to follow any particular
policy, a citizen-candidate’s political affinity is determined by his economic affiliation. Hence each
citizen-worker would prefer a candidate drawn from his own sector. Thus in the elections at the
beginning of period T = 1, all losers vote for any citizen-candidate from sector A (who is a loser
like them) while the winners will vote for any candidate from sector M. A similar argument works
for the elections at the beginning of period T = 2.
Given this voting behavior, we now derive the outcomes of the elections and policy decisions in
periods T = 1 and 2 by backward induction. Consider possible outcomes at the end of the second
stage of economic reforms. If the fraction of winners after the second stage of reform, α˜+(1− α˜)α2,
are in a majority, then the citizen-candidate who will be elected into office for the last period will be
from this group, and he will choose zero redistribution. On the other hand, if α˜+ (1− α˜)α2 ≤ 1/2
i.e. if α˜ ≤
1
2
−α2
1−α2 , the A-sector workers are in a majority, and thus a loser will be elected to office
for period T = 2. He will set the maximal tax-transfer rates t2 = τ so as to equalize incomes, as
much as possible, between the winners and the losers.14 This can be summarized as follows.
lemma 1: At T = 2, there is maximal redistribution with t2 = τ if the ‘losers’ are in a majority,
and no redistribution otherwise.
Moving sequentially backward, we consider the decision of T = 1 government on taxation t1
and on whether to continue or halt the second-stage of reforms R1. These decisions, together with
the decision R0 to initiate reforms in the first place, is analyzed in the proposition below.
14This follows from our assumptions on the feasible tax-transfer vector: namely, symmetric treatment for individuals
with identical wages, and non-regressivity. As in Dixit and Londregan (2005), this also follows from the simple
structure of the model, in which voters maximize post-tax income (‘homo oeconomicus’, in the terminology of Corneo
and Gru¨ner, 2002), rather than other social objectives.
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Proposition 1:
(a) The unique equilibrium policy decision of the T = 1 government is given by:
(I) If α˜ ≤ 12 , then there is maximal possible redistribution of income, i.e. t1 = τ .
Reforms are continued, i.e. R1 = 1, if
(i) α˜ ≤ max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δτ(1+δ) } under condition 1 ; or
(ii) α˜ ∈ (α∗τ , αm] under condition 1′
where αm =
1
2
−α2
1−α2 .
Otherwise, the reform runs into a political impasse, i.e. R1 = 0.
(II) If α˜ > 12 , then there is no redistribution and reforms are continued i.e. t1 = 0, R1 = 1.
(b) At T = 0, reforms are initiated if
(1 + β)(αθw − (1− α)δθw) + β
∫
α˜∈Ic(τ)∪( 12 ,1]
{α˜awθ + (1− α˜)[α2(1 + a+ δ)wθ − (1− α2)δwθ]}dF (α˜) > 0
(2)
where Ic(τ) = [0,max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δτ(1+δ) }] under condition 1 ,
and Ic(τ) = (α
∗
τ , αm] under condition 1
′.
Proof: (a) The equilibrium policy decision at T = 2 has already been derived in Lemma 1.
For the decision in period T = 1, consider the scenario where reforms have been initiated and
at the end of period T = 0, the proportion of winners is α˜. Here we can have two cases – with the
winners being in a majority or not.
If α˜ > 12 , i.e., the winners are in a majority, then a citizen-candidate from this group (i.e. the
M sector) will be voted into office in both periods T = 1 and T = 2. In this case, the government
will choose to continue with the reforms and set zero taxes in both of these periods.
In contrast, if α˜ ≤ 12 , the ‘losers’ are in a majority at the end of period T = 0 and thus a
representative from this group will be elected into office for period T = 1. He will choose the
maximal tax-transfer rate, t1 = τ , so as to equalize, as much as possible, incomes between the
winners and the losers in period T = 1. He also faces the decision on whether to continue with
the second-stage reforms, or not i.e. R1. On the one hand, by stopping the reform, the A-sector
workers (the ‘losers’) retain their current majority in the next period, so that the tax-rate that will
be implemented then is the maximal one i.e. t2 = τ.
Let us denote by V (R1; τ) the expected post-tax income for period T = 2 of an A-sector citizen
from decision R1, given the state capacity constraint of τ. The value to the A sector workers from
14
stopping further implementation of the reform is given by:
V (0; τ) = (1− τ)w(1− δθ) + τ [α˜w(1 + θ) + (1− α˜)w(1− δθ)] (3)
In other words, the period T = 2 post-tax income of an A-sector worker is a weighted average,
with weights being (1− τ) and τ respectively, on the pre-tax wage of an A-sector worker, and the
average income of the population as a whole, after the first stage of the reform.
On the other hand, if he chooses to continue with the reform, two possibilities arise.
(a) If α˜ ≤
1
2
−α2
1−α2 = αm , then A sector workers will continue to be in a political majority in the future
and the maximal possible redistribution τ is assured at the end of the second period. Comparing the
expected payoffs from R1 = 1 versus R1 = 0 in this case, a first-stage loser will choose continuation
of the reforms only if15:
V (1; τ)− V (0; τ) = wθ[τα˜a+ (1− τα˜){α2(1 + a+ δ)− (1− α2)δ}] > 0
i.e. if α˜ >
(1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)
τ [a+ (1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)] =
α∗
τ
(4)
Note that if (1−α2)δ < α2(1+a+δ), i.e. under condition 1, the above inequality is always satisfied,
implying that, with α˜ ≤ αm , a first-stage ‘loser’ will always prefer to continue with the reform.
(b) If α˜ > αm , the continuation of reforms will result in a shift of political power towards the
M sector, resulting in zero redistribution at the end of the second stage. Again, anticipating the
expected future payoff from continuing with the reform V (1; τ), an A-sector worker will prefer the
reforms to continue only if16:
V (1; τ)− V (0; τ) = wθ[α2(1 + a + δ)− (1− α2)δ − τα˜(1 + δ)] > 0
i.e. if
α2(1 + a+ δ)− (1− α2)δ
τ(1 + δ)
> α˜ (5)
Note that the the left-hand side of (??) is negative under condition 1′. Thus in this case, the
first-stage losers will never vote to continue with the reforms when α˜ > αm.
15In this case,
V (1; τ) = (1− τ)[α2w(1 + (1 + a)θ) + (1− α2)w(1− 2δθ)]
+τ [(α˜+ (1− α˜)α2)w(1 + (1 + a)θ) + (1− α˜)(1− α2)w(1− 2δθ)]
16In this case,
V (1; τ) = α2w(1 + θ(1 + a)) + (1− α2)w(1− 2δθ)
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Combining the analysis of the two cases, thus first-stage losers will only choose to continue
with the reform if α˜ < max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δτ(1+δ) } under condition 1, and if α˜ ∈ (α
∗
τ , αm] under
condition 1′. Furthermore, given our assumptions on tie-breaking, these are the unique decisions in
this sub-game.
(b) Moving to decision making in period T = 0, the incumbent citizen-government initiates the
economic reform only if the expected gains from it, anticipating the politics in periods T = 1 and
T = 2, is positive.
Under condition 1′, consider an individual’s ex-ante expected two-period gain from initiating
the reform, anticipating the continuation decisions and tax-rates at T = 1 and T = 2. The expected
gain for period T = 1 is given by:
E[α˜{(1− τ)θw + τ(α˜θw − (1− α˜)δθw)}
+(1− α˜){−(1− τ)δθw + +τ(α˜θw − (1− α˜)δθw)}]
= E[α˜θw − (1− α˜)δθw]
It is thus independent of the state capacity parameter τ. Similarly under condition 1.
Again from an ex-ante individual perspective, the period T = 2 gains under condition 1′ are
given by :
α˜(1 + a)θw + (1− α˜){α2(1 + a)θw − (1− α2)2δθw} if α˜ > 12
(1− τ){α˜(1 + a)θw + (1− α˜)(α2(1 + a)θw − (1− α2)2δθw)}
+τ{α˜(1 + a)θw + (1− α˜)(α2(1 + a)θw − (1− α2)2δθw)} if α˜ ∈ (α
∗
τ
, αm]
α˜θw − (1− α˜)δθw otherwise
In the first case, the winners are in a majority and set the tax-rate t2 = 0; thus the gains are
independent of state capacity. In the third case, reforms are not continued, and thus the gains are
the same as in period T = 1, which we have shown before is independent of τ. In the second case,
when α˜ ∈ [α∗τ , αm], the expression simplifies to:
α˜(1 + a)θw + (1− α˜)(α2(1 + a)θw − (1− α2)2δθw)
which is again independent of τ.
Similarly, it can be shown that under condition 1 as well, the ex-ante expected gains at T = 2
are independent of the state capacity parameter τ in each case.
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Combining these two gains, the decision on whether to launch the reform or not depends on if:
(1+β)(αθw− (1−α)δθw)+β
∫
α˜∈Ic(τ)∪( 12 ,1]
{α˜awθ+(1− α˜)[α2(1+a+δ)wθ− (1−α2)δwθ]}dF (α˜) > 0
where Ic(τ)∪(12 , 1] denotes the range of α˜ over which reforms are continued when the state capacity
is τ. From part (A), Ic(τ) is given by Ic(τ) = [0,max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δτ(1+δ) }] under condition 1,
and Ic(τ) = (α
∗
τ , αm] under condition 1
′.. Furthermore, given our assumptions on tie-breaking (i.e.
any indifference is resolved in favor of not implementing the reform), these are the unique decisions
by the T = 0 government.
As described above, at each sub-game the outcome is uniquely defined. Hence overall the
equilibrium is unique. 
Together with lemma 1, the above proposition describes the entire set of policy sequences that
may arise in a political equilibrium to the game. To focus on the effect of politics on the trajectory
of reform, we first consider the case of perfect state capacity i.e. τ = 1, when the government can
equalize incomes if it chooses, and compare the above trajectory with the set of efficient choices
described in the previous section. This reveals two kinds of inefficiency, which are highlighted in
the corollary below.
Corollary 1: In the political equilibrium with τ = 1, (i) the reform is inefficiently discontinued
when α˜ ∈ (max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ1+δ }, 12) under condition 1, and when α˜ ∈ (αm, 12) under condi-
tion 1′ ; (ii) if δ < 1, there exist values of α˜ under which average wages go up in the first period
and yet the reform is discontinued; (iii) the parameter sub-space for which the reform is launched
at T = 0 is smaller than economically efficient under condition 1, and under condition 1′ when
α∗ < 12.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
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The first source of inefficiency is related to the dynamic continuation of reforms, and is character-
ized in figure 2.17 While ‘very successful’ first-stage reforms (i.e. those where α˜ > 12) automatically
find support for continuation, because the winners form the majority, it is the reforms with ‘mid-
dling’ levels of success that face the danger of running aground – so that we end up in an equilibrium
with partial reform. This is particularly stark under condition 1, when the reforms are efficient
17Figure 2 is drawn for the case where αm =
1
2−α2
1−α2 >
α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ
1+δ
so that max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ1+δ } = αm.
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even on a ‘stage-by-stage’ basis, i.e. individual prospects from further reform are positive even for
the first-stage losers, thus making it economically optimal to always continue with the reforms.
However, as part (i) of the corollary shows, even with positive future prospects, the majority may
prefer discontinuation of the reforms over a wide range.
The above corollary emphasizes the key role of political constraints, embodied in the trade-
off that is faced by citizen-workers who are losers at the end of the first stage of reforms. On
the one hand, continuation results in efficiency benefits from the second-stage reforms. However,
continuation of the reform has a potentially negative “political control” effect in the sense that
after the second stage of reforms, the winners may be in the majority. This prospect of losing
political control is important, since in that case the current majority group of losers from the first
stage of reform will lose the political power to extract compensation from the winners at the end of
the second stage. The danger of losing political control is particularly acute when the fraction of
first-stage winners is relatively high (i.e. α˜ > αm), so that together with the second-stage winners
they may form the majority group in period T = 2. Thus, paradoxically, less successful first-stage
reforms (i.e. α˜ ≤ αm) may find political support for continuation while more successful ones may
run aground.18 This is despite the fact that (as under condition 1) all citizens may share a positive
view of the future prospects of further reform. Thus an appealing aspect of the above equilibrium
policy sequence is that it captures, in a very simple framework, the emergence of a political impasse
as a natural dynamic implication of the reform process. It helps to throw light on a large empirical
literature that has long puzzled over the finding that public opinion about the reform process, and
about the particular government implementing the reform, frequently varies negatively with the
performance of the reform.
Corollary 1(iii) points out that there is a second source of inefficiency that arises in political
equilibrium, which has to do with the initiation of the reforms. As mentioned before, comparing
condition (??) with (??), one can see that in the presence of political constraints, the condition
for initiating reforms is harder to satisfy. Again, this is related to the dynamic considerations
of the problem. The first part of the expression on the left-hand side of (??) gives the lifetime
18While we do not consider the possibility of a complete reversal in reforms in period T = 1 (to the initial status-
quo), it can be incorporated into the model in a fairly straight-forward fashion. In that case, if the winners are in
political control in period T = 1, obviously they will never choose to reverse. On the other hand, if the losers are
in control of the government in period T = 1, under condition 1, continuation always leads to a rise in aggregate
income. Thus, in this case, their decisions in Proposition 1 are unchanged even given the possibility of reversal.
Under condition 1′ however, reversal is optimal for very low values of α˜. In this case, when the losers are in control
in period T = 1, they will wish to reverse the reform for α˜ below a certain cutoff i.e. when α˜θw − (1− α˜)δθw < 0.
The intuition behind the political impasse of Proposition 1, however, is still valid.
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expected benefits from the first-stage reform, while the second part is the incremental gain from
implementing the second stage of reform. As efficient continuation of the reforms (and thus the
realization of the incremental gain) is less likely in the future, the expected value of reforms is lower
under political constraints. This reduces the incentive to launch them in the first place.
It is worth emphasizing an implication of part (ii) of the above corollary: political support for
reforms may be negatively correlated with its performance. To see this, observe that first period
average wages go up when α˜wθ− (1− α˜)wδθ > 0 i.e. when α˜ > δ1+δ . But good current performance
does not necessarily ensure continuation of the reform as reforms with α˜ between αm and 12 are
discontinued (in spite of α˜ exceeding δ1+δ ). In fact, better future prospects may not translate into
continuation either. Under condition 1, while future prospects are always positive, they are higher
when the first-stage income is higher i.e. α˜ is bigger. Under condition 1′, although a first-stage
loser’s expected gain from continuing reform is negative (in the absence of compensation), reforms
with a high α˜ in the first stage still have the prospect of raising total social welfare in the future.
Thus, in this case, it is reforms which are “doing well” (i.e. have a high α˜) that are expected to be
beneficial if continued into the future. However, it is precisely these ‘well-performing’ reforms that
face a (greater) danger of being discontinued. This is entirely consistent with the empirical puzzle
documented by Stokes (2001), that in many instances, political support for the reform process
seemed to go down with an economic upturn e.g. in Peru, Argentina and Poland. For example,
in Fujimori’s Peru, “when GDP rose, the proportion of respondents who opposed the reform rose,
relative both to the proportion of supporters and to people with no opinion” Stokes (2001, p.165).
She goes on to estimate that an increase in GDP, from its minimum to its maximum over this period
of reform, would have resulted in a 30 percent increase in public opinion opposed to continuation
of the reform. Examining public opinion in Argentina, Echegaray and Elordi (2001) find that an
increase in average real-wages reduced public support for continuation of the reforms.19 Similarly,
as Stokes (1996), Remmer (1991) and Graham and Sukhtankar (2004) document for a variety of
mostly Latin American countries, the evolution of public opinion about the reform process, and
about the government implementing that reform, frequently varies negatively with the performance
of the reform.20 Elsewhere, Przeworski’s (1993) analysis of the dynamics of public support over the
19In our model, under condition 1, prospects from further reform are always positive, regardless of the realization
of α˜ in the first period. Under condition 1′ (provided α2 is not too close to 0), a rise in first-period average wages
implies positive prospects for future reform and economic efficiency calls for its continuation. Yet, under political
constraints, the majority may oppose it.
20Stokes (1996, p. 515) summarizes some findings of Remmer’s (1991) empirical analysis of the political impact
of economic crisis in 12 Latin American countries from 1982-1990: “[I]ncumbent parties suffered larger losses at the
polls when inflation went down (significant), the incumbent party’s share of the vote was larger when inflation rose
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economic reform process in Poland in the nineties finds that finds that “Continuation of reforms is
threatened when the economy shows the first signs of recovery”.
In explaining this puzzling dynamic to the evolution of support about reforms (at least in some
instances), previous explanations have tended to attribute the results to irrationality on the part
of voters. Przeworski (1993) suggests that his “findings suggest individual myopia”, while Stokes
(1996) argues that the public’s responses frequently suggest that they hold “...the belief that if
things get worse they will later get better... [I]f the economy improves early on, the public may
believe that reforms are failing and turn against the government” (p. 505).
By contrast, our mechanism emphasizes the importance of rational political calculus in de-
termining public opinion. In a democracy, the distribution of winners and losers over the reform
process affects not just public opinion but also potentially affects political support for the incumbent
government. If continuation with the reform implies that political power will shift to the economic
‘winners’, then low wage workers may rationally be worried about whether the government will tax
these winners to compensate the losers. In contrast, so long as the reform provides overall gains,
autocratic governments’ decision-making about redistribution is likely to be less sensitive to (shifts
in) the political balance between winners and losers. In other words, the credibility of redistributive
promises in non-democratic countries may be higher, and hence support for reform (even amongst
potential losers) remains high. Thus, the main driving force of our mechanism should be more ap-
plicable for democratic than relatively autocratic countries. In line with this mechanism, Denisova
et. al. (2009) find that there is no difference in public opinion between potential winners (i.e. high
skill workers) and losers (i.e. low skill workers) on whether to continue with or reverse economic
reforms in autocracies. Furthermore, they find that as the level of democracy increases there is
an increasing gap in the public opinion in favor of continuation of the reform between higher and
lower skill workers. Similarly, it may seem at first glance that the Mexican experience with reforms
during 1988-1997 is very different, with Mexican public opinion for or against reform a monotonic
reflection of its ongoing economic performance (Laredo, 2001). However, this too is consistent with
our framework: during this period, Mexico was close to a one-party state with the PRI so firmly
entrenched in power that the populace did not worry that the government might be replaced or
may go back on its redistributive promises. Accordingly, we argue that there is evidence to support
the key mechanism underlying Proposition 1, namely, that the power to redistribute may shift over
the reform process.
and when GDP fell”.
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2.5 Imperfect State Capacity and Economic Reforms
In this sub-section, we examine the effect of the state’s fiscal capacity constraints on the decision
to initiate reforms as well as on their trajectory. As discussed earlier, following Besley and Persson
(2011), we have modeled the state’s capacity as the maximum tax-rate τ ≤ 1 that can be imple-
mented by the government. How do differences in state fiscal capacity affect the political incentive
to continue with an ongoing economic reform, as well as its initiation? This can be determined by
analyzing the effect of τ on the equilibrium policy sequence in proposition 1. This is contained in
the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Under condition 1, higher state capacity τ makes it less likely that reforms are
continued in period T = 1, and contracts the size of the parameter space over which reforms are
initiated in the first place. The opposite is true under condition 1′.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This corollary suggests that state fiscal capacity can affect the political sustainability of reform
in unexpected ways. An important factor affecting the analysis is the nature of the evolution of
individual prospects over the reform process (i.e. whether the reform is characterized by condition
1 or 1′). To understand the intuition behind the results, we consider each of these scenarios in turn.
I. Economic Reform under condition 1: Recall that, under condition 1, even the first-stage losers
expect their wages to rise if the reform is continued to a second stage. Thus, even in the absence
of any redistribution in period T = 2 (as would happen if state capacity was very low or if the
losers were to lose political control), first-stage losers would expect to gain from continuing the
reform. This implies that if they knew that they would maintain political control in the next
stage, then they would surely prefer to continue with the reforms as it would increase both their
(expected) personal income as well as the redistributed income. Hence, the marginal reforms under
consideration in this case are those in which the first-stage losers stand to lose political control from
continuation.
In such a scenario, how does their expected future income (with zero compensation) compare
with their income from discontinuing the reform, in which case they maintain their first-stage
political control and enjoy the redistributed income from the first-stage winners? When state
capacity is low, this latter benefit is negligible. Hence they will be inclined to vote for continuation
of the reforms, gambling on an increase in their personal wages rather than remaining losers for
sure, with little compensation to boot. Now consider the impact of an increase in state capacity.
The first-stage losers can now acquire much more compensation (when they are in political control)
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from the first-stage winners. In other words, the economic benefit from retaining political control
becomes much more important. Thus, they will now be less keen to continue the reform which may
jeopardize this political control (and the corresponding redistributive benefits). In this case, better
state capacity can thus be inimical to the continuation of reforms.
II. Economic Reform under condition 1′: Recall that, under condition 1′, continuation of reform is
likely to identify relatively few new winners and prospects for first-stage losers are negative. Most of
the efficiency benefits from continuation accrue through even larger gains (in the form of increased
wages) to those who had already benefited from the first stage of reforms. Meanwhile, the wages
of the first stage losers are likely to decrease (in expected terms) from continuation. Thus, citizens
affiliated with the losing sector in period T = 1 will never want to continue with the reforms if
they anticipate losing political control in the future as a result. This is because in such a case
their personal (expected) wages will decrease, and in addition, they will lose the ability to force
redistributive transfers from the majority.
This implies that the marginal reform being considered for continuation in this case is one in
which the first-stage losers maintain their political control in the future. Greater fiscal capacity on
the part of the state means that the losers will be able to obtain a bigger share of the increased
gains of the first-stage winners that continuation will bring. Thus in this case, as state capacity
increases, the first-stage losers are more likely to decide in favor of continuation of the reform.
A related question is how differences in state capacity affect the prospects for the initiation of
economic reform. Two considerations need to be kept in mind. First, observe that at the beginning
of period T = 0, all citizen-workers have ex ante identical prospects from economic reform. In other
words, they are equally likely to be winners or losers. Given risk-neutrality, this implies that in
computing the expected gains from reform, the anticipated tax-rate drops out of the calculations
(shown formally in the proof of proposition 1(B)) i.e. this expected payoff is independent of the
ability of the state to tax winners to compensate losers. However, differences in state capacity have
an impact on the continuation of reforms. Thus, any effect that moves the continuation decisions
closer to the efficient ones will improve the overall gains from the reform and thus encourage its
initiation in the first place. Hence, the differential impact of state capacity on continuation of
reforms is also present in the initial decision to begin reforms or not. Reforms which involve an
increasing degree of compensation over time (i.e. satisfying condition 1′) require a higher degree of
fiscal capacity on the part of the state in order for the citizens to agree to their initiation. On the
other hand, for reforms in which the second stage gains are assured even without any compensation
(i.e. satisfying condition 1), the fear of reforms inefficiently running aground in higher capacity
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states may make citizens more hesitant in initiating them.
3 Identity Politics and the Dynamics of Reform
In the previous section we saw that distributional conflict between winners and losers can reduce
the political sustainability of economic reform. As a number of observers have pointed out, ethnic
divisions can also undermine economic reform (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001, for a discussion). For
instance, if initial winners (or losers) are concentrated in specific ethnicities, then this may catalyze
ethnic conflict that can jeopardize the continuation of further reform (Bangura and Gibbon, 1992).
This has been observed in the history of economic reform in countries such as Kenya, Uganda
and other parts of Africa and also in Armenia, Georgia and the former Yugoslavia (see Horowitz,
2005).21 It is perhaps not surprising that economic reforms may run into a political impasse if its
distributional effects occur along ethnic lines, and thus spark ethnic conflict.
Less noticed, but perhaps more remarkable, are the instances where economic reform seems to
proceed despite the contemporaneous presence of ethnic conflict. This is illustrated in its most
striking form in the Indian experience with the politics of reform in the past couple of decades. As
pointed out by Kohli (2006), political campaigns in India during this period coincided with voter
mobilization on an ethnic-caste basis “instead of the less volatile interest-oriented appeals”. This,
he argues, may not have hurt the political sustainability of economic reform. Relatedly, Varshney
(1998) argues that India’s political elite managed to push through economic reform by exploiting
the caste and religious dimensions of mass politics. Indeed, in his survey on the politics of India’s
economic reform, Kumar (2008) summarizes the views of a variety of observers as: “Atul Kohli,
Ashutosh Varshney and Jeffery Sachs suggest that the aggressive politics – affirmative legislation
in favor of the backward classes and the rise of [Hindu nationalism] – had so formed the template
of political India that identities rather than economic reforms continued to dominate the language
as well as the rhetoric deployed at the ground level. Mass politics, already aroused by passions,
they argue, “far outweighed reform politics”.”
Our benchmark model has demonstrated that distributional conflict may politically undermine
the continuation of economic reform. This makes it particularly well suited to examine whether
or not non-economic factors (such as ethnicity), and the potential for conflict that they engender,
21For example, President Museveni’s attempt to reform the land tenure system in Uganda was crippled by ethnic
conflict, because the adverse distributional consequences of this reform were concentrated on the Baganda (Green,
2006). Similarly, according to Lehman (1992), reform in Kenya could not be politically sustained due to the (ethni-
cally) uneven incidence of benefits and costs from further land reform.
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can also affect the political sustainability of reform. Accordingly, we extend our benchmark model
to allow for the possibility that citizen-voters care about another dimension in addition to the
economic one – namely, identity. Our extension adapts Glaeser (2005) to examine conditions under
which the incumbent has an incentive to stoke ethnic or sectarian tensions in order to increase
the likelihood of remaining in power. In particular, in addition to his income, each citizen-worker
has an identity-characteristic X or Y , which can be race, caste, religion, language or ethnicity. A
fraction nj of the population has characteristic j, where j ∈ {X, Y }. We will assume that group
X is in the majority i.e. nX > 12 > nY .
22 We assume that the economic gains from reform (i.e.
the probability of being a winner at each stage) are identically distributed across these two groups,
thereby deliberately ruling out the scenario where political conflict arises from the differential gains
from reform across the two ethnic groups. To simplify the analysis, in this section, we assume that
state capacity is perfect i.e. τ = 1.
In each period T the citizen-government chooses a policy aT that determines the nature of a
non-economic public good (which can be, for example, government patronage of culture, language
or religion). There is uncertainty about the degree of congruence in preferences across the two
groups over this public good. In particular, the gap in preferences ∆ across the two groups on this
non-economic dimension can either be small, ∆ = 0 (congruent preferences), or large ∆ = 1 (i.e.
incongruent preferences). If ∆ = 0, then both groups benefit in the same way from a given policy
aT on the non-economic dimension. On the other hand, if ∆ = 1, their benefits are diametrically
opposed i.e. if group X benefits from a particular policy aT , it must mean that group Y gets
harmed and vice-versa.Initially, all citizens share the same beliefs about this degree of congruence
in preferences across the two groups; this is denoted by Prob(∆ = 1) = ε.We assume that ε is ‘small’
so that ex-ante, the perceived differences across the two groups are negligible and thus initially,
politics is based only on the economic dimension. However, if the citizens become sufficiently
convinced that the underlying state of the world is ∆ = 1, citizen-voters of all types would prefer
the citizen-government to be affiliated with their own ethnicity.
The overall utility for a citizen is given by the sum of his economic payoff and his non-economic
payoff G(k, e; ∆), where k ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the voter is of the same ethnic group as the
citizen-government; and e ∈ {0, 1} denotes the ‘experience’ of the politician. We set e = 1 for an
incumbent who is re-elected, and e = 0 for a first-term government. Thus, G(1, e; ∆) denotes the
22We should point out that the model that we present can be considered to be a special case of a more general
multi-dimensional framework, where the choice of which dimension to emphasize can be a decision of the incumbent
government. A politically vulnerable government might prefer to make that dimension politically salient which
maximizes the probability of its re-election.
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utility to a citizen on the non-economic dimension from having in office a politician of the same
ethnicity, and experience e when the state of the world is ∆. The corresponding utility when the
politician in power belongs to the opposite ethnicity is given by G(0, e; ∆). Following the discussion
above, we assume that the ethnicity of the politician in power matters to voters only if the state is
∆ = 1, in which case all citizens prefer a person of their own ethnicity to run the government. If
∆ = 0, the ethnicity of the politician does not matter:
Assumption 1 : G(1, e; 1)> G(0, e; 1) and G(1, e; 0) = G(0, e; 0).
We also assume that experience matters: ceteris paribus, the incumbent has an advantage over
an otherwise identical challenger, perhaps because over time the incumbent becomes more efficient
both at producing the publicly provided good, and also at funneling this good to his own group:
Assumption 2 : G(1, e = 1;∆) > G(1, e = 0;∆).
The two assumptions together imply, in particular, that if the state is ∆ = 1, then on the
non-economic dimension, all citizens prefer an experienced person of their own ethnicity to run the
government.
‘Incidents’ and Propaganda: There is a possibility of a violent ‘incident’ ν = 1, which could be a
local clash between two individuals who belong to different castes or ethnicities. The cause of the
‘incident’ can be prior personal differences between the two individuals unrelated to their ethnicity,
or it may arise as a by-product of larger differences in preferences arising from their different
ethnicities. The chances of such ‘incidents’ between members across these two communities are
higher when their preferences differ than when they are congruent. Accordingly, we assume that
the probability of such clashes when ∆ = 1 is greater than when ∆ = 0, i.e. c1 ≡ P (ν = 1|∆ =
1) >> c0 ≡ P (ν = 1|∆ = 0).
Initially, as ε is small, ethnic identity does not play a role in determining citizen-voters’ pref-
erences over candidates. However, if they learn about clashes or riots between individuals of the
two groups, citizens will update their prior beliefs about the differences between the two groups.
These violent ‘incidents’, if they occur, are local events, and are unobserved by the wider populace.
However, the government can choose to use government machinery to broadcast this ‘incident’ to
the wider populace. An incumbent may find it to his advantage to engage in this political propa-
ganda, if it enhances his prospects of continuing in office, in which case he reaps further ‘ego-rents’,
which we denote by R. For simplicity, we assume that if the incumbent politician spends resources
r(i) on such propaganda, news about the occurrence of the violent incident reaches a fraction i of
the population.23 Glaeser (2005) terms such propaganda as ‘hatred’, as such a supply of ‘negative
23In order to keep things simple, we follow Glaeser (2005) in allowing only the political incumbent to engage in
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stories’ serves to enhance negative feelings of one ethnic group towards another.
The timing of the game is the same as before, except for the following addition. At the end of
period T = 0, after the distributional effects of the first stage of reforms have been realized and
the identity of the incumbent (in terms of representing the ‘winners’ or ‘losers’) been revealed, the
incumbent politician makes a decision on whether to use the government machinery to engage in
political propaganda and broadcast news of a violent ‘incident’ (if any has occurred) to the wider
populace. As before, we are interested in examining the policy sequences (in terms of continuation
and stoppage of reforms) that can emerge in a political equilibrium here.
Before embarking on the formal analysis, we intuitively examine the issue under consideration.
The point of departure from the earlier analysis occurs in the case when αm < α˜ < 12 , so reform
continuation would run into an impasse, but the incumbent politician of period T = 0 is revealed
to be an economic winner from the reform. In this case, the economic losers (those left behind in
the A sector) are in a majority, and if they were to vote based only on the economic dimension,
they would oust the incumbent and instead elect an A sector worker to office for the next period.
Anticipating this, can the incumbent (whose economic affiliation is now with the winners i.e. those
in the M sector) still win re-election? If he can successfully raise the political salience of ethnicity
by using political propaganda to exploit any ethnic divisions, then he stands to gain not only from
continuing in office, but also from continuing the reform, which would otherwise grind to a halt in
his absence.
The following analysis of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game examines: (i)
under what conditions would such a strategy of ethnic propaganda be successful, and (ii) when is
it worthwhile for the incumbent to incur the costs of adopting such a strategy?
Demand side of Ethnic Politics: We first examine the conditions under which a citizen prefers to
vote on the basis of his ethnicity rather than his interest on the economic dimension. In particular,
consider an individual who receives information on the occurrence of an ‘incident’ between individ-
uals belonging to the different groups. Upon receipt of such information, this individual updates
his belief that the state of the world is ∆ = 1 to Prob(∆ = 1|news of incident) = εc1εc1+(1−ε)c0 , which
is higher than ε. Given that such clashes are relatively rare when ∆ = 0 as compared to when
propaganda. In other words, the challenger is assumed to lack the machinery to investigate the ‘incident’ and/or
broadcast it to the wider populace. This is of course a simplification. The general argument would hold so long as the
incumbent government had better access to information about violent incidents, and was better able to disseminate
this information.
Secondly, we assume that the incumbent can only enhance public awareness about an incident that actually occured.
He cannot ‘manufacture’ evidence.
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there are large differences in preferences between the groups i.e. ∆ = 1, the news of any random
clash will cause individuals to update their beliefs about there being large differences between the
groups to beyond ε. Upon receiving such information, the question is whether this individual will
vote based on his ethnic or economic proclivity. Those who do not receive any new information
keep their beliefs about ∆ unchanged.
If the incumbent at the end of the first period is a ‘winner’ from group X, then all winners from
(the majority) group X will choose to vote for him because of their alignment on both dimensions.
The question is whether the losers from group X will wish to continue to support this ‘winner’
incumbent from their own group. The most stringent condition for their support will occur if the
challenger at this stage is a ‘loser’ from the same ethnicity X. If they support the incumbent in this
case, they will do so in all other cases as well. So, when does their benefit on the non-economic
dimension outweigh the economic gains from having a ‘loser’ in office?
On receiving information about an incident ν = 1, a group X citizen-voter will prefer an
incumbent ‘winner’ from his own group to a ‘loser’ so long as the following inequality holds:
[G(1, e = 1;∆ = 1)− G(1, e = 0;∆ = 1)] εc1
εc1 + (1− ε)c0 > S(α˜) (6)
where S(α˜) is the relative economic gain from having a ‘loser’ in office, and is described below.
Citizen-voters who belong to groupX and who are also first-stage losers face a dilemma. If they were
to choose based solely on the economic gains (given by the right-hand side of the above inequality),
they would strictly prefer the challenger, who is also an ‘economic loser’ and also belongs to group
X . However, if the benefits from experience in efficiently transferring the ethnic goods (given by
the left-hand side of (??)) are large enough, they may choose to vote for the ‘winner’ incumbent.24
As we show in Appendix A, this economic gain S(α˜) from choosing a ‘loser’ government versus a
‘winner’ comes from two sources: (i) the difference in tax-rates set by the two kinds of governments
in period T = 1, and (ii) differences in their reform continuation strategies. The crucial feature
is that S(α˜) is increasing in α˜. In other words, the economic loss from re-electing the incumbent
is bigger when the proportion of first-stage winners α˜ is higher. Thus a strategy of using ethnic
differences to sway voters will only work when α˜ is relatively small. This can be seen from condition
(??) which, given that S(α˜) is increasing in α˜, only holds for α˜ below a certain cutoff, denoted by
αc.
24We should emphasize that we have chosen this particular formulation only for simplicity. There are other scenarios
which will give rise to similar incumbency effects. See Padro i Miquel (2007) for an elegant explanation of why a
group may continue supporting an incumbent from its own group despite large losses in economic welfare.
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Supply side of ethnic politics: The analysis so far has studied whether a strategy of amplifying
ethnic clashes to foment ethnic sentiments may work for the electoral benefit of an incumbent who
would otherwise be unseated. There is still the question of whether the incumbent is willing to
incur the costs of this amplification. Recall that if he spends resources r(i), then fraction i of the
population receive news of the clash. Among those voters (from either ethnic group) who do not
receive any news, there will be no update in their belief ε about the distance between the groups,
and they will vote based on economic considerations only. In order to see how the incumbent’s
share of the vote varies as a function of his expenditure on amplification, r(i), we consider the two
groups of voters in turn. Among the voters from ethnic group X , those who emerge as ‘winners’,
numbering nX α˜, will vote for the incumbent (since he is aligned with them on both the economic
and ethnic dimensions). Among the ‘losers’ from this group X , only those that receive news about
the clash, numbering nX(1− α˜)i, will do so (and only if condition (??) is satisfied). All voters from
group Y who receive news about the clash will analogously choose not to vote for the incumbent,
but of those group Y voters who do not hear the propaganda, the incumbent will draw support
from the economic winners, numbering nY α˜(1− i).
Thus the share of the votes for the incumbent will be nX α˜ + nX(1− α˜)i+ nY α˜(1 − i), which
needs to exceed 12 for the incumbent to win. Hence the minimum i required for winning the election
is given by
1
2
−α˜
nX(1−α˜)−nY α˜ . Given that the rents from being reelected to office are R, the incumbent
will be willing to adopt this strategy only if:
R > r(
1
2 − α˜
nX(1− α˜)− nY α˜ ) (7)
In the absence of any amplification the only voters who will vote for the incumbent are the
winners i.e. a fraction α˜ of the population. Note that
1
2
−α˜
nX(1−α˜)−nY α˜ is decreasing in α˜, since nX >
1
2
and α˜ < 12 here. Intuitively, the amount of propaganda needed in order to assemble a majority is
lower, the higher is the proportion of winners, α˜, who are economically aligned with the incumbent.
This implies that condition (??) only holds for α˜ high enough. In other words, there exists a cutoff
value of α˜, say αcc, above which the politician will be willing to adopt the strategy of using ethnic
manipulation to further his tenure in office and also continue with the reforms.
Together, the demand and supply conditions lead to the following proposition, which character-
izes parameters under which ethnic differences can aid the continuation of reform. While the focus
of the proposition is on equilibrium policy sequences that involve this specific type of continuation,
its proof characterizes the entire equilibrium policy sequence.
Proposition 2: For ε >ε, there exists an interval [αcc, αc] such that when α˜ ∈ [αcc, αc], in equi-
librium a group X incumbent from sector M invests r(i) in propaganda that makes ethnic group
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identity politically salient in the elections at the beginning of period T = 1. In this case, the incum-
bent is re-elected and continues with the economic reform in period T = 1 with no redistributive
tax-transfers to compensate the losers from the first stage of economic reform.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Therefore, we may have a scenario where political reform continues not despite ethnic conflict,
but rather because of it. Interestingly, such a strategy of using non-economic issues to ensure re-
election (and thereby continuation of the reforms without compensation for the losers) works only
when the initial success with the reform, α˜, is in an intermediate range. If the reforms are very
unsuccessful i.e. generates a large proportion of losers, it is very costly for a ‘winner’ incumbent to
persuade enough of them to vote for him in order to get reelected. On the other hand, when the
reforms are sufficiently successful i.e. αc < α˜ < 12 , the losers would prefer to have political control
by having a ‘loser’ politician in power. This would ensure them compensation from the winners,
the level of which is high when α˜ is high. In such a situation, they would not be swayed by ethnic
considerations in their voting decision and would be influenced by economic factors alone. However,
for a range of moderately successful first-stage reforms, ethnic conflict can be strategically used to
reduce the possibility of political impasse that may otherwise arise (as in Proposition 1).
4 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple framework that allowed us to throw light on different aspects
of the political sustainability of economic reform in developing countries. When economic reforms
give rise to distributional conflict, the initial success of reform can in fact give rise to a political
backlash. Indeed our framework shows that, pace Przeworski (1993) and Stokes (2001), the often-
puzzling dynamics of public opinion over the course of large-scale economic reform may not be due
to some kind of myopia or irrationality on the part of voters, but rather a result of rational political
calculus on the part of the interim majority. A large literature has emphasized that political reforms
are easier to adopt and sustain if losers can be compensated. Accordingly, a natural presumption
may be that greater capacity on the part of the state in taxing winners to compensate losers will
increase the political sustainability of reform. However, our analysis suggests a note of caution:
depending on the type of reform being considered, greater state capacity can help or hinder both
the initiation and political sustainability of reform. Finally, we throw light on the presumption
that ethnic conflict is typically likely to undermine economic reform. In a simple extension of our
benchmark model, we suggest that this need not always be the case. Indeed, a politician may
increase the political sustainability of economic reform, precisely by making ethnicity (or other
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non-economic dimensions) politically salient.
However, we should emphasize that there are several facets of our framework that warrant
future exploration. First, our framework took a state’s fiscal capacity to tax and redistribute as
exogenously given over the duration of the reform. However, given that state capacity can plausibly
be improved by investment choices made by governments, it would be interesting to examine the
politics of investment in state capacity over the course of economic reforms. Second, our analysis
on the effects of introducing a non-economic dimension on the political sustainability of reform had
several simplifying conditions. It would be useful to develop a richer framework with an endogenous
media sector that could either facilitate or hinder government propaganda, thereby reinforcing or
undermining the government’s ability to politically sustain economic reform (see Stromberg, 2004).
Third, we do not consider here the issue of workers’ incentives to invest in furthering their chances of
moving to the growing sector. In the context of land reforms, Ghatak and Mookherjee (2011) look
at the incentives of tenants to invest in the quality of land, anticipating their share of compensation
from future sale of the land. In our context, it would be of interest to study the two-way interaction
of these incentives with the dynamic politics of reforms.
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Appendix A
Proof of Corollary 1: The first part of the corollary follows directly from comparing the reform
continuation decisions with and without political constraints. For part (ii), note that if the reform
is initially launched, average wages in the first period are given by α˜w(1 + θ) + (1− α˜)w(1− δθ).
Thus the average wages go up if α˜ > δ1+δ . Then from figure 2, it is clear to see that if
δ
1+δ <
1
2 (i.e.
if δ < 1) there exist values of α˜ between δ1+δ and 0.5 such that the average wages go up and yet
the reform is discontinued.
For (iii), note that Ic(1) ∪ (12 , 1] is smaller than the interval [αc1, 1], under condition 1, and
under condition 1′ if α∗ < 12 . Thus the condition (??) for the initiation of reform in the political
equilibrium is harder to satisfy than the efficiency condition (??). For example, there exist β and
α which satisfy (??), but not (??), implying that political considerations can lead to economically
efficient reforms not being launched.
Proof of Corollary 2: From proposition 1, under condition 1, a first-stage loser will choose
continuation of the reforms at T = 1 only if:
α2(1 + a+ δ)− (1− α2)δ
τ(1 + δ)
> α˜
Note that as state capacity τ increases, the cutoff for continuation falls, thus making the decision
for adopting R1 = 1 more stringent. In this case, better state capacity makes the continuation of
reforms less likely.
On the other hand, under condition 1′, an A-sector worker will prefer to continue with the
reforms at T = 1 only if:
α˜ >
(1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)
τ [a+ (1− α2)δ − α2(1 + a+ δ)] =
α∗
τ
Note that as τ increases, the right-hand side of the inequality decreases, thus making the decision
for adopting R1 = 1 less stringent. Here, better state capacity makes the continuation of reforms
more likely.
The reform initiation decision R0 is given by whether condition (??) is satisfied or not. As
shown above, the set Ic(τ) contracts weakly with an increase in τ under condition 1 and expands
weakly under condition 1′. This affects the second term on the left-hand side of (??), which gives
the incremental (positive) gain from continuing with the second-stage of reforms. Hence the overall
gain from reform falls due to a rise in τ under condition 1 and makes it harder to satisfy the above
inequality. The opposite holds under condition 1′.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Firstly, in the election at the beginning of period T = 0, all candidates are identical with respect
to their preferences over reform. Thus each citizen will vote solely based on their ethnic alignment.
Since group X is in a majority, the candidate selected will be from this group.
The main difference in the equilibrium here, as compared to the previous proposition, lies in
the analysis of the election at the beginning of period T = 1. Suppose the incumbent at this stage
has been realized as a ‘winner’ from group X . If no ‘incident’ has occurred, the game proceeds as
before and the equilibrium policy sequence is as before, in proposition 1. The interesting case is
when there has been an ‘incident’. Will the incumbent find it worthwhile to foment ethnic discord
by spreading propaganda about this incident, and will the electorate be willing to vote based on
the non-economic dimension? If α˜ > 12 , then the winners are in a majority and so the ‘winner’
incumbent (from group X) will get a majority of the votes and win without having to resort to
any ethnic propaganda. Thus in this case, the equilibrium policy sequence is unchanged from that
derived in proposition 1.
If however α˜ < 12 , the ‘winner’ incumbent would be ousted from power on economic consider-
ations alone as the economic losers are in a majority. So the question is whether condition (??)
holds so that the losers’ economic loss S(α˜) from reelecting the ‘winner’ incumbent is compensated
by their gain on the ethnic front. S(α˜) has two components:
(i) The redistributive (tax) benefit in period T = 1, from choosing a ‘loser’ government versus a
‘winner’, which is given by:
T (α˜) = {α˜w(1 + θ) + (1− α˜)w(1− δθ)} − w(1− δθ) = α˜wθ(1− δ)
where the first term, in curly brackets, represents the average income after a first-stage reform,
and the second term represents the wage of a loser, with no redistribution, after a first-stage reform.
(ii) The difference in the continuation decision for the two types. Here we will need to consider a few
cases. Under condition 1,when α˜ ≤ max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ1+δ }, the losers would prefer the reforms
to continue. Thus, reelecting the ‘winner’ incumbent only entails the redistributive loss T (α˜), but
no change in the reform continuation decision. If however 12 > α˜ > max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ1+δ }, a
‘loser’ government will not allow reforms to continue beyond the first-stage, while a ‘winner’ would
prefer to do so. Calculating the gains in the two cases gives S(α˜) below.
Under condition 1,
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S(α˜) =
α˜wθ(1− δ) if α˜ ≤ max{αm, α2(1 + a+ δ)− (1− α2)δ1 + δ }
and α˜wθ(1− δ) + βwθ{α˜(1 + δ)− α2(1 + a + δ)− (1− α2)δ} otherwise
where the second term in the second line represents the (discounted) difference between α˜w(1 +
θ) + (1 − α˜)w(1− δθ), the average income after a first-stage reform which has run aground, and
α2w(1+ θ(1+ a))+ (1−α2)w(1− 2δθ), the expected wage (for a first-stage loser) from the second-
stage reform, with no redistribution. From the above expressions, we can clearly see that S(α˜) is
increasing in α˜. A similar derivation under condition 1′ also shows that S(α˜) increases with α˜. (The
only difference is the range of α˜ over which the first expression in S(α˜) above holds - the rest is
unchanged).
Thus under each condition, there exists an upper bound αc on α˜ such that (??) holds for all α˜
below αc, where αc is given by αc = S−1([G(1, 1; 1)−G(1, 0; 1)] εc1
εc1+(1−ε)c0 ). In this case, the losers
from group X will prefer to vote for the incumbent ‘winner’ rather than a ‘loser’ from their own
group.
Thus, the possibility of ethnic politics can change the equilibrium voting behavior only if α˜ ≤ αc.
On the other hand, whether or not the incumbent ‘winner’ will in fact be willing to use the
strategy of using ethnic propaganda or not depends on his payoffs, which is given by the condition
(??). As noted before, this condition holds when α˜ exceeds the lower bound αcc, given by αcc =
1−2nXr−1(R)
2(1−r−1(R)) .
To ensure that αcc < αc, we need:
S[
1− 2nXr−1(R)
2(1− r−1(R)) ] < [G(1, 1; 1)−G(1, 0; 1)]
εc1
εc1+ (1− ε)c0
Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is increasing in ε. Thus this inequality is satisfied
for ε higher than a cutoff-value ε.
Combining the analysis of the supply and demand for ethnic propaganda, we see that for ε >ε,
the equilibrium policy sequence now changes from a political impasse of R1 = 0 to R1 = 1 if
α˜ ∈ (αcc, αc) and α˜ ∈ (max{αm, α2(1+a+δ)−(1−α2)δ1+δ }, 12) under condition 1, or if α˜ ∈ (αcc, αc) and
when α˜ ≤ α∗τ or α˜ ∈ (αm, 12) under condition 1′.
In all other cases, the equilibrium policy sequence is the same as derived in Proposition 1 (with
τ = 1).
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Appendix B [Intended for publication online]
To check the robustness of the basic results, we consider an alternate formulation of the model
with a more direct focus on the proportion of winners realized early versus later i.e. the speed
of realization of uncertainty from the reforms. We retain the same structure of the model in
terms of the sequence of decision-making and politics, but change the structure of the resolution of
uncertainty in the following manner: If the government decides to initiate reforms i.e. R0 = 1, then
the state of the world α˜ is realized, which gives the total proportion of winners from the reform.
In period T = 0, each individual has probability sα˜ of being a winner i.e. finding employment in
sector M ; their wages go up to w(1 + θ) while those of the losers go down to w(1− δθ). If reforms
are continued in period T = 1 i.e. R1 = 1, then among the initial losers, each has probability
(1−s)α˜
1−sα˜
of becoming a winner, with wages going up to w(1+θ(1+a)), while that of the losers goes down to
w(1− 2δθ). Hence, the mass of winners in the first phase of reforms is sα˜, while that in the second
phase is (1− s)α˜. Thus, the speed of resolution of uncertainty in this case is captured directly by
the variable s; a high value of s denotes the case where most of the uncertainty is resolved early on
i.e. reforms are speedy in determining eventual winners versus losers.
The rest of the model remains the same: elections at the end of periods T = 0 and T = 1;
the government in power in period T = 1 decides on the degree of redistribution t1 ≤ τ and on
continuation of the reforms R1; and the government in period T = 2 decides on t2 ≤ τ.
Analyzing efficient decision-making in this case, reforms in period T = 1 should be continued
only if:
sα˜awθ + (1− s)α˜wθ(1 + a+ δ)− (1− α˜)δwθ > 0
i.e. if α˜ >
δ
δ + a+ (1− s)(1 + δ) = α
∗∗ (say)
Incorporating politics, we again use backwards induction to analyze the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game. The tax decisions in periods T = 1 and 2 remain the same as before: if a
‘loser’ is in power, he implements maximal redistribution while if a ‘winner’ is in power, he chooses
zero redistribution. As before, the primary focus here is on the reform-continuation decision R1 in
period T = 1.
If the realized α˜ in period T = 0 is such that sα˜ > 12 , then the ‘winners’ are in political control
at T = 1 and will clearly choose to continue with the reforms. At the other extreme, if α˜ < 12 , then
not only are the ‘losers’ in control at T = 1, they realize that they will retain control also in the
next period even if the reform is allowed to continue. Thus, their decision to allow continuation of
the reform at T = 1 will depend on their individual gains taking into account the compensation
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they can obtain from the winners i.e. choose R1 = 1 if:
0 < τwθ[sα˜a+ (1− s)α˜(1 + a+ δ)− α˜δ]
+(1− τ)wθ[ (1− s)α˜
1− sα˜ (1 + a+ δ)− (1−
(1− s)α˜
1− sα˜ )δ]
i.e. if
δ
α˜
< (1 + a+ 2δ)
1− s
1− sα˜ − τs(1 + δ) + τ
s(1− α˜)
1− sα˜ (1 + a+ 2δ) (8)
The expression on the left-hand side is decreasing in α˜, while the right-hand side is increasing in
α˜; thus for a given level of state capacity τ, there will be a unique cutoff value α(τ) such that in
the case of α˜ < 12 , the ‘losers’ in period T = 1 will choose to continue with the reforms only if
α˜ > α(τ). Furthermore, α(τ) is decreasing in τ meaning that as state capacity τ increases towards
1, the continuation cutoff moves towards the efficient value of α∗∗.
In the intermediate case when α˜ ∈ [12 , 12s ], the first-stage losers are in political control, but realize
that if they allow the reforms to continue, they will lose their political power and consequently the
ability to redistribute in the future. In this case, comparing their expected payoffs in the two cases,
they will support continuation of the reforms i.e. R1 = 1 only if:
(1− τ)w(1− δθ) + τ [sα˜w(1 + θ) + (1− sα˜)w(1− δθ)]
<
(1− s)α˜
1− sα˜ w(1 + θ(1 + a)) + (1−
(1− s)α˜
1− sα˜ )w(1− 2δθ)
i.e. if
δ
α˜
<
1− s
1− sα˜ (1 + a+ 2δ)− τs(1 + δ) (9)
The left-hand side of the above inequality is decreasing in α˜, while the right-hand side is increasing.
Hence, for a given level of state capacity τ, there will be a unique cutoff value α(τ) such that in
the case of 12 ≤ α˜ ≤ 12s , the ‘losers’ in period T = 1 will choose to continue with the reforms only
if α˜ > α(τ). Furthermore, α(τ) is increasing in τ meaning that as state capacity τ is enhanced,
continuation becomes less likely i.e. inefficiency increases.
Summarizing, in this alternate version of the model, when the ‘losers’ are in political control in
period T = 1, they will only vote for continuation of the reforms if α˜ ∈ [α(τ), 12 ]∪ [α(τ), 12s ] = I(τ)
(say). Hence there are cases of α˜ > α∗∗, where it is efficient to continue with the reform, but it runs
aground due to political considerations. Greater state capacity enhances efficiency at the lower
end of the interval by decreasing α(τ), while it reduces efficiency at the upper end of the range
by increasing α(τ). The model here thus captures both the effects of state capacity as discussed in
the basic model. How does the speed of resolution of uncertainty of the reforms affect which effect
dominates?
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Note that if α(τ) > 12s , then the upper segment of I is not present, and in this case the effect
of greater state capacity would be to enhance efficiency by lowering the cutoff value α(τ) towards
α∗∗. The condition under which α(τ) > 12s can be deduced by setting α˜ =
1
2s in the inequality (??)
and checking whether the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side i.e. α(τ) > 12s if:
s >
2(1 + a+ 2δ)
2(1 + a+ 2δ) + 2δ + τ(1 + δ)
= ŝ (say)
Thus the conclusion here is similar to Corollary 2 in that greater state capacity makes it more likely
for efficient reforms to continue when much of the uncertainty is resolved in the initial stages i.e. s
is high enough so that s > ŝ.
On the other hand, if α(τ) > 12 , then the lower segment of I is not present, and in this
case the effect of greater state capacity is to reduce efficiency by raising the cutoff value α(τ) for
continuation of the reform. The condition under which α(τ) > 12 can be deduced by setting α˜ =
1
2
in the inequality (??) and checking whether the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side i.e.
α(τ) > 12 if the following holds:
(1 + a)[2− s(2− τ)] + δ[2− s− 2s(1− τ)]− τs(2− s)(1 + δ) < 0
Since the left-hand side is decreasing in s, there exists a cutoff value ̂̂s over which this inequality
holds. Thus over the range s ∈ (̂̂s, ŝ), greater state capacity reduces the chances of continuation of
efficient reforms.
When s is below ̂̂s, both of the effects of state capacity are present, and which one dominates
depends on how a change in τ affects the size of the interval I(τ).More precisely, it is determined by
the effect of τ on F ( 12s )−F (α(τ))+F (12)−F (α(τ)), which depends on the shape of the particular
distribution for α˜.
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